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Abstract 
The article seeks to reanimate the early regulation theory project of building Marxist 
political economy through the development of mid-range institutional theory. The 
concept of a mode of regulation – central to the Parisian wing of regulation theory – is 
rejected in favour of a distinction between functional and dysfunctional accumulation 
regimes. The Fordist regime of accumulation provided a unique institutional context 
allowing an extraordinary combination of high profits, rising real wages and strong GDP 
growth. In contrast, the postfordist regime is shown to be inherently dysfunctional, 
characterised by manifest tendencies toward stagnation and associated regressive trends 
in work and employment relations. A comparative analysis of profit rates, wage shares, 
growth rates and debt in the US, UK and Germany shows that the single model of a 
dysfunctional postfordist accumulation regime fits all three countries, although with 
important differences in forms of dysfunctionality. 
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During the 1980s and ‘90s the concepts of Fordism and postfordism animated lively 
debates in the sociology of work. Many accepted Fordism as a good characterisation of 
traditional mass production and the wider institutional context of the 1950s and ‘60s. 
However, some influential scholars developed a theory of postfordism promising 
industrial regeneration through post-Taylorist forms of work organisation and 
decentralised production, prompting heavy criticism in the pages of this journal (Dawson 
and Webb, 1989; Smith, 1989; Williams et al., 1992; Thompson, 2003). In particular, 
various ‘postfordist scenarios’ (Thompson, 2003) were seen as inconsistent with the 
diversity of employment arrangements in advanced capitalism, including regressive 
trends such as declining employment security, work intensification and rising inequality. 
At the same time, there were calls in this journal for moving beyond labour process 
analysis to examine how work and employment relations shape and are shaped by larger 
dynamics of capitalist accumulation (Hyman, 1987; Thompson, 2003) and class relations 
(Crompton, 2010).  
The argument of this article is that while critics of utopian versions of postfordism 
were largely correct, they tossed the baby out with the bathwater. The bathwater 
consisted of approaches that took the Fordism/postfordism framework from its critical, 
Marxist roots and recast it as a theory of industrial regeneration, most influentially the 
theory of flexible specialisation (Piore and Sabel, 1984). The baby was that very critical, 
Marxist framework – regulation theory – which saw Fordism as a unique period of class 
compromise, rooted in Taylorist mass production, providing two decades of strong 
growth with rising real wages. This article argues that the regulationist research program 
continues to provide a unified theoretical framework for analysing the interrelations 
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between labour processes, employment relations, corporate forms, class relations and 
accumulation dynamics. But it also criticises and rejects a core concept of the Parisian 
wing of regulation theory – the ‘mode of regulation’ – which was a key theoretical 
development marking a broader shift in regulation theory from an approach in which 
stable and strong growth under capitalism was viewed as an unlikely and remarkable feat 
to one preoccupied with searching for a new mode of regulation to anchor strong growth 
(Lipietz, 1992; Boyer and Saillard, 2002b).  
The article begins by responding to the core criticisms of the concept of 
postfordism elaborated in this journal. The second section develops a distinction between 
functional and dysfunctional accumulation regimes by integrating regulation theory with 
other approaches to Marxist political economy. The argument developed here is that 
Fordism was a uniquely functional (but not functionalist) accumulation regime in its 
ability to temporarily contain inherent capitalist tendencies toward stagnation, but these 
have now been permanently unleashed under postfordism which, as such, is a 
dysfunctional regime. This dysfunctional regime provides the structural context within 
which deunionisation and employment externalisation have led to polarised job growth. 
The final section presents a comparative analysis of profit rates, wage shares, growth 
rates and household debt in the US, UK and Germany. The outcome shows that the single 
model of a dysfunctional postfordist accumulation regime fits all three countries, 
although with important differences in forms of dysfunctionality. As such, regulation 
theory provides an alternative framework to the varieties of capitalism approach, which, 
in its exclusive focus on institutional difference, tends to obscure the common nature of 
capitalist economies. 
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Postfordism as a model of production 
The conceptual apparatus of Fordism and postfordism was developed by French 
régulation theorists as a research program of mid-range, institutionalist Marxist political 
economy. Based on the US case, Aglietta (2000 [1979]) articulated a multilevel 
conceptualisation in which Fordism was both a model of production – mass production of 
standardised products with a Taylorist division of labour – and a macroeconomic regime 
of accumulation in which mass production was matched with mass consumption by 
institutionalising a class compromise via unionisation and the welfare state. The Fordist 
regime generated strong growth and rising real wages from the end of WWII to the late 
1960s, but then experienced declines in profits, productivity and growth. Following 
Palloix (1976), Aglietta suggested that the organisational response was likely to be 
neofordism: mass production combining flexible automation with the new flexible 
working arrangements going under names such as job enlargement and group work.  
 In an influential book, Sabel (1982: 220) shifted the focus of the framework from 
its critical emphasis on neofordism to a more optimistic, prescriptive approach focused 
on the notion of a post-Taylorist model inspired by the neocraft ‘high-technology cottage 
industry’ of the Italian industrial districts. In a later, even more influential book with 
Piore (1984), they developed the same arguments but shed the language of Fordism and 
introduced the concept of flexible specialisation. As Smith (1989) perceptively noted, the 
terminological shift was not simply semantic; flexible specialisation was meant to be a 
more encompassing concept, going beyond the industrial districts of Italy to include 
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incipient changes in mass production sectors, thus narrowing the distance between 
Fordism and flexible specialisation.  
A few early contributions in WES were more sympathetic to the arguments of 
Piore and Sabel, in particular Streeck (1987) and Lane (1988: 165, 167) who saw merit in 
the post-Taylorist model but were sceptical about the possibility for its widespread 
adoption, particularly in countries like the UK with an entrenched history of Taylorism. 
The more common reception in WES was to be deeply critical of this framework, seeing 
flexible specialisation as the leading postfordist alternative to the neofordism. Dawson 
and Webb (1989) argued that the flexible specialisation thesis was problematic because it 
assumed the dominance of a single organisational model based on manufacturing. Smith 
(1989: 216) observed similarly that ‘industrial diversity is endemic to capitalist 
competition and reflects the separation of capitals, and the costs attached to innovation 
and inertia.’ For Thompson (2003: 359, 361) Fordism was ‘the least worst term available 
to describe a set of social relations that manifest a degree of connectedness and 
coherence.’ In contrast, ‘Post-Fordist scenarios’ were ‘not only radically at odds with 
reality; they are, as widely observed, lacking any analytical or empirical coherence.’ 
Rather than radical continuity proposed by postfordist theories, there has been a partial 
break with Fordism. Managers attempt to gain more mental effort and commitment from 
workers to engage in flexible work practices, but are unable to reciprocate commitment 
and provide security because of increased market pressure due to the rise of shareholder 
value, deregulation and internationalisation.    
In sum, postfordism has been criticised for using a single model of production 
based on manufacturing to explain broad societal change, thus being unable to deal with 
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empirical diversity; for proposing radical discontinuity between paradigms, thus missing 
important elements of continuity; and for being utopian. The latter two criticisms are 
more easily dealt with. Utopian formulations are indeed problematic but they were 
simply one vein in the development of the broader analytical framework. But why 
continue with the terminology rather than adopting something with less baggage? 
Because Fordism refers to a unique institutional period in the history of capitalism in 
which the ravages of market competition were tamed. Using the concept of postfordism, 
shorn of utopian or monolithic formulations, helps bring the uniqueness of the Fordist 
period – and the problems of postfordism – into sharp relief. And it captures the 
institutional interconnectedness between trends such as tertiarisation, financialization and 
neoliberalism. This simply need not imply a radical break. Post simply means ‘after’ and 
there is no theoretical reason why such a conception cannot include elements of 
continuity and change. Within manufacturing, lean production is the predominant 
postfordist production model, which includes continuities in terms of neotaylorism and 
mass production, but is new and distinct in three respects: demand-driven rather than 
supply-driven production, vertical disintegration rather than vertical integration, and 
diversified rather than standardised output (Vidal, 2011). Beyond manufacturing, as will 
be argued below, there are important additional elements of discontinuity in the shifting 
international division of labour, state intervention, employment relations and forms of 
competition.  
The third criticism is sound: a singular model of production based on a particular 
manufacturing labour process does not provide a good basis for distinguishing between 
economic periods. Rather than seeing Fordism and postfordism as particular types of 
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labour process, they are better conceptualised as accumulation regimes within which a 
variety of distinct labour processes and employment relations may be established (Vidal, 
forthcoming). In our view, the theory of accumulation regimes provides a basis for 
analysing the interconnections between trends in work, employment relations, 
accumulation dynamics and class relations, allowing for diversity of arrangements but 
focusing attention on how structural pressures common to capitalism are filtered through 
and shaped by particular institutional configurations.  
 
Theoretical reconstruction: Postfordism as a dysfunctional accumulation regime 
Functional versus dysfunctional regimes of accumulation 
Marx (1992 [1885]) anticipated the ‘Keynesian’ problem of effective demand with his 
discussion of the problem of ensuring balance between what he called Departments I and 
II, respectively, the producer goods and consumer goods sectors. Aglietta (2000 [1979]) 
examined the US case to show how expanded reproduction – relatively stable, internally 
driven growth – could happen only when there was balance between the two departments. 
Such balance was achieved historically through a transition from an extensive to an 
intensive regime of accumulation: from a period of uneven development in the productive 
forces focused heavily on the producer goods sector, whose main markets were 
agricultural industries and infrastructure development, to one where capitalist production 
spread to the consumer goods sector, thus extending commodification by establishing a 
norm of market-based consumption. The Fordist regime established intensive growth 
based on rising real wages (hence mass consumption) via a class compromise with unions 
and vertically integrated, internalised employment. 
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For Aglietta (2000 [1979]), the analysis of expanded reproduction through the 
theory of regulation is a crisis approach offering a complete alternative to equilibrium 
theory. The term ‘mode of regulation’ did not appear in Aglietta’s 1979 text, where he 
used the concept of accumulation regime to refer to the entire social formation in a given 
period. In terms of English language publications, Boyer (1979) introduced the idea in a 
foundational article where he distinguished a competitive régulation – written as a noun, 
like a mode of regulation – from a monopolistic régulation. In the former, wages do not 
follow productivity growth, so real wage growth has to occur through price reductions. In 
the latter, explicit wage indexation became standardised through collective bargaining. 
Boyer’s argument about types of regulation of wage determination was compelling and 
his body of work is remarkable, contributing numerous theoretical advances and 
empirical insights. But the growth model he developed is deeply problematic. In this 
model (Boyer, 1988; Boyer and Saillard, 2002a; Boyer and Saillard, 2002b), strong 
growth is achieved only when an underlying accumulation regime becomes stabilized and 
guided by a mode of regulation. The latter is realized only when coherent interrelations 
are established across five institutional domains: work and employment relations, forms 
of competition, money and credit, the state and the insertion of the national economy into 
the international system. But given the myriad ways in which the variety of institutions 
would have to cohere, such a formulation is not empirically viable. In theoretical terms, 
the ontological or analytical status of the distinction between ‘regularities’ of the 
underlying regime and the ‘institutional forms’ of its mode of regulation (Boyer, 1988: 
71, 75) is vaguely elaborated and remains unclear.  
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In place of this distinction we propose a distinction between functional and 
dysfunctional accumulation regimes. Rather than seeing institutions as distinct from an 
underlying accumulation regime, in our formulation accumulation regimes are constituted 
by the full range of institutions relevant to supporting or hindering capital accumulation, 
including the five institutional domains of regulation theory, but with no expectation that 
the various institutions will congeal into anything resembling a coherent mode of 
regulation. We develop the theory through engagement with other approaches to Marxist 
political economy.  
Profit is the basis of capitalism. The higher the average profit rate, the more 
attractive investment, and vice versa. If the rate of profit is falling, it will increasingly 
discourage investment, hence output and employment. The central source of the tendency 
of the rate of profit to fall for Marx was the rising technical composition of capital, that 
is, increasing physical capital per unit of labour input. If surplus labour is the source of 
profit, and competition spurs capitalists to substitute machines for labour, this will put 
downward pressure on profits, hence undermining the basis of the system. Many Marxists 
(e.g. Shaikh, 1978) argue that Marx correctly saw the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, 
driven by the rising technical composition of capital, as the central crisis tendency of 
capitalism. However, Clarke (1990-1991: 448) persuasively argued that the central crisis 
tendency under capitalism – the one that makes crises a necessary feature of the system – 
derives from a tendency toward overproduction, itself an outcome of ‘the contradiction 
between the tendency for capital to develop the productive forces without limit … and the 
tendency to restrict the consumption power of the mass of the population, by displacing 
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living labour, forcing down the value of labour-power and expanding the reserve army of 
labour.’  
Continuing with Clarke’s (1990-1991: 453) interpretation, the falling rate of profit 
is not the source of crisis but a tendency that intensifies the above contradiction. 
Overproduction is an inherent tendency because capitalists experience limits in the 
market, ‘barriers to the production and realisation of surplus value,’ as ‘barriers to be 
overcome.’ Fuelled by credit, capitalists will attempt to overcome the limit of the market 
by expanding production, and some will be successful in expanding it by making cheaper 
products or creating new ones, but the economy will always hit a new limit as 
innovations are generalised. In aggregate, the tendency to overproduction can take the 
form of either a glut of commodities or imbalances (disproportionalities) in capacity 
between departments and sectors, as more dynamic sectors develop the forces of 
production more rapidly. This results in periodic crises of overaccumulation – a surplus 
of capital with a lack of sufficient outlets for investment – in which capital is devalued, 
capacity destroyed and unemployment increased through bankruptcies, mergers and 
acquisitions. Such crises set the stage for renewed profitability and accumulation.  
 The tendency toward overproduction is permanently manifest through ‘the class 
struggle over the production of surplus value, and the competitive struggle over its 
realisation’ (Clarke, 1990-1991: 465). Although Clarke does not explicitly elaborate it as 
such, the implication is that class struggle may generate more contingent crisis 
tendencies, either a profit squeeze due to high wages or underconsumptionism, depending 
on who is prevailing. Underconsumptionism in this analysis is not the crude version 
based on a theory of consumer demand as the ultimate purpose of capitalism, an 
10 
 
argument vehemently rejected by some Marxists (e.g. Kliman, 2012) who correctly insist 
that surplus value is the primary drive of capitalism. Rather, underconsumptionism is a 
contingent expression of the necessary tendency toward overproduction.  
Based on this reading we elaborate a distinction between accumulation regimes 
that are functional, dysfunctional or in crisis. This terminology should not be confused 
with functionalist reasoning. It is simply a way of distinguishing between accumulation 
regimes that are prosperous from those that are stagnant, not an argument that certain 
institutions exist due to the functions they serve for the system.  
Following Harvey (2010), the term crisis is reserved for periods of severe 
slowdown in growth, typically associated with bubbles (due to speculation with surplus 
capital and/or disproportionate growth fuelled by loose credit), and always followed by 
large-scale devaluation of capital. Harvey noted that global crises fitting this description 
have occurred in 1848, 1929, 1973 and 2008, the latter of which has resulted in losses of 
$50 trillion in asset values so far. If we want to reserve the term crisis to refer to extended 
recessions resulting in extensive bankruptcies, the destruction of capital value and 
widespread corporate restructuring, then it makes sense to refer to the other tendencies 
associated with crisis theory as something else. We suggest stagnation tendencies, 
referring in particular to the rising technical composition of capital, a profit squeeze and 
underconsumptionism. Each generates fragility, instability and stagnation, intensifying 
the contradiction between the tendencies toward overproduction and the restriction of 
consumption power.  
Marx and subsequent Marxists have also discussed countertendencies (elaborated 
in the following section) to what we call stagnation tendencies; hence an accumulation 
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regime is functional when all of the stagnation tendencies have been offset. In such a 
context the economy will grow at steady rate, likely well above 3% per annum that is 
deemed ‘normal’ growth among mainstream economists. The stagnation tendencies may 
become manifest, however, without developing into a full-blown crisis. An accumulation 
regime is dysfunctional when there is evidence that one or more stagnation tendencies are 
no longer being offset, but the economy remains out of crisis for an extended period of 
time.  
In addition to the stagnationist tendencies of a low profit rate or 
underconsumptionism, we argue that a third is debt-led growth, an idea borrowed from 
Kaleckian macroeconomics (Onaran et al., 2010; Stockhammer, 2012). Briefly, 
Kaleckians distinguish investment-led regimes, where investment demand can internally 
drive growth and compensate for declining consumer demand, from wage-led regimes, 
where investment-demand does not compensate for declining consumer demand. Debt-
led regimes are wage-led regimes in which consumer credit plays a significant role 
sustaining consumer demand. Debt-led regimes are fragile because high debt servicing 
levels mean that even temporary reductions in income will lead to increasing defaults 
(Stockhammer, 2012). Finally, there are also export-led regimes, where exports are a 
significant component of demand.  
Based on the manifestation of stagnation tendencies, we define the following 
three forms of dysfunctional accumulation: A declining or historically low profit rate 
along with an associated rise in the capital/labour ratio (TCC) or the wage share (profit 
squeeze); underconsumptionism, as indicated by declining or historically slow growth 
(growth below 3% p.a.) along with a decline in the wage share; and debt-led growth, as 
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indicated by moderate growth levels and a declining wage share offset by rising/high 
household debt levels.  
 
The Fordist and postfordist accumulation regimes 
The model of Fordism and postfordism developed in this section is heavily based on our 
in-depth analyses of the US (Vidal, 2012; Vidal, forthcoming), but we believe the general 
outlines of the model will hold for the UK and Germany, although with distinct 
institutional configurations within the general model. Our main goal here is to develop a 
general theoretical model of the postfordist accumulation regime and present a 
comparative macroeconomic analysis for all three countries in support of this model. In-
depth institutional analysis on the UK and Germany will have to await future research.  
The Fordist accumulation regime is defined here as a nationally-bound, mass-
production based economy with producer-driven supply chains, oligopolistic competition 
in core sectors and a Keynesian welfare state. The canonical case was the US, in which 
the structural context allowed a class compromise between capital and labour, led by the 
big three auto companies and the United Auto Workers and diffused through pattern 
bargaining, in which wages were indexed to productivity, allowing a satisfactory profit 
rate and economy-wide rise in real median wages (Vidal, 2012). West Germany and the 
UK developed a similar structural context, the former realising class compromise rooted 
in family-oriented Christian Democracy (Gottfried, 2000), the latter largely failing to 
reach a sustained class compromise over production control and wages (Tickell and Peck, 
1992).  
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In the US case, there is strong evidence that the Fordist regime effectively offset 
the various crisis and stagnation tendencies for 15 or so years. The profit rate in the 
Fordist period was high initially because it followed a massive decline in the value of 
physical capital and the nominal value of financial assets during the Great Depression 
and WWII (Kliman, 2012). A rise in the organic composition of capital was offset by a 
continuous rise in productivity (Wolff, 2003) generated by intensive growth (Aglietta, 
2000 [1979]), underconsumptionism offset by rising real wages (Lipietz, 1986) and 
overproduction moderated through nationally-bound, oligopolistic competition, again 
with balanced growth via standardised mass production and institutional supports for 
mass consumption (Aglietta, 2000 [1979]). On the profit rate decline, Shaikh presented 
evidence for the US (1987) and Duménil and Lévy (2004) for the US, Germany, France 
and the UK, showing a rising technical composition of capital. Wolff (2003) and Mohun 
(2009) provided evidence that the US profit rate decline was driven both by a rising 
technical composition of capital and a profit squeeze. Glyn and colleagues (2007) 
presented data showing a profit squeeze due to full employment for the US, France, 
Germany, Italy, the UK and Japan. With a secular decline in profit rates across the OECD 
beginning in the mid to late 1960s, Fordism transitioned into a dysfunctional regime.  
 
In response to Fordist stagnation, corporations engaged in widespread 
restructuring, accelerating the changing division of labour through global outsourcing and 
diversification of large corporations into a range of service sectors, resulting in a shift in 
power from manufacturing firms toward large retailers controlling global supply chains 
(Vidal, forthcoming). This corporate restructuring (along with technical change) ushered 
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in the postfordist accumulation regime, which is service-based with buyer-driven, 
internationalised commodity chains, intensified, wage-driven competition even in core 
sectors and a neoliberal state. On the shift to services, the top ten US employers in 1955 
were all manufacturers, while the top 25 in 2011 included only two manufacturers, seven 
general merchandisers and three restaurant companies (Vidal, forthcoming). 
Because there is no such thing as a coherent mode of regulation, accumulation 
regimes cannot be dated with precision. It takes many years – around a decade in our 
analysis – before institutional transformations such as internationalisation, tertiarisation 
and financialization settle into new configurations. While closely interrelated, such 
institutional transformations happen through a diffuse array of organizational changes 
that are coterminous neither within nor across national accumulation regimes. But we can 
roughly date Fordism from 1945 through the early 1970s when profit rates were rapidly 
declining in all three countries, stagflation kicked in, the Bretton Woods system of fixed 
exchange rates collapsed and firms began a wave of restructuring to recover profitability 
and increase flexibility. As a matter of convenience, we might date the consolidation of 
postfordism in these three countries from 1982-83. As the empirical analysis in the 
following section will show, in a quite remarkable convergence all three countries 
experienced a turnaround in the profit rate decline in this two-year period (Germany and 
the UK in 1982, the US in 1983), although none experienced a sustained recovery to 
Fordist rates.  
A central focus of regulation theory is the historical process of changing 
articulation among institutional domains (Boyer, 2000). What is commonly referred to as 
the standard model of employment – full time, long-term employment with a single 
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employer, including security and opportunities for training and promotion – is something 
historically specific to the Fordist regime. This model was made possible because 
competition and finance were subordinated to work and employment relations, the former 
through oligopolistic competition in the core manufacturing sector, the latter because 
Fordism still provided opportunities for intensive growth and profit based on mass 
consumption. Among the institutional shifts in the postfordist regime are that core 
employers are now large service firms and supply chains buyer-driven, and that 
competition and finance have come to dominate employment relations in new ways, most 
importantly by putting wages, even for core firms, back at the centre of competition. 
In terms of employment, Fordism was characterised by a logic of internalised 
employment relations, meaning that best business practice was understood to include 
vertically-integrated firms with internal labour markets, including detailed job ladders 
with well-defined training and promotion opportunities, and administratively-determined 
wages associated with positions rather than individuals. The pressure of the declining 
profits provided the context within which intensified competition and financialization 
began to shape employment relations. In particular, the internationalisation of production 
and the rise of the shareholder value model of the firm (Lazonick and O'Sullivan, 2000) 
combined to generate a new predominant logic of externalised employment relations, that 
is, outsourcing and deunionisation, reducing employment security, training and 
promotion opportunities, and returning to market-determined wages (Vidal, 
forthcoming). The shareholder value model ensured that the externalisation logic took 
hold even in core service sectors like retail sales, leisure and hospitality that are 
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ostensibly more shielded from international wage competition than jobs subject to 
offshoring.  
In addition to the shareholder value revolution and the dramatic rise in power of 
financial markets, workers’ revenue has become financialized via credit-financed 
consumption, allowing banks to extract profit directly from wages (Lapavitsas, 2011: 
615, 618). We agree with Lapavitsas that financialization is not a simple ‘triumph of the 
rentier over the productive capitalist’ as post-Keynesians have argued, but still plays a 
critical role in mobilising capital for the accumulation process. However, we disagree 
with his rejection of the argument that financialization is also in part an attempt to 
generate profits in response to overproduction. Total capacity utilisation in the US 
averaged 87.2% from 1967-69, 82.8% in the 1970s, 79.6% in the 1980s, 82.4% in the 
1990s and 77.4% in the 2000s.1 As Marx argued, ‘accumulation comes up against 
difficulties of application, against a lack of spheres of investment, i.e. if branches of 
production are saturated and loan capital is over-supplied, this plethora of loanable 
money capital proves nothing more than the barriers of capitalist production’ (Marx, 
1981 [1894]: 639, his emphasis). Indeed, daily trading on world currency markets 
skyrocketed from $18 billion per day in 1977 to $1.8 trillion per day by 2008, in 2004 the 
daily turnover of foreign exchange and interest rate derivative contracts was $2.4 trillion, 
and in 2005, 92% of futures contracts were on financial instruments with only 8% on 
commodities (Foster and Magdoff, 2009). These data provide strong support for the 
argument that overcapacity and overaccumulation were key drivers of financialization.  
 
Comparative analysis of postfordist accumulation regimes 
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We use all available data back to 1945, but there are differences in availability for 
particular series in each country. On profit rates, we follow Kliman (2012) in using 
corporate profit as a proportion of net capital stock at historical cost for the US and UK. 
However, because data specific to the corporate sector are not available for many other 
countries (including Germany), we also present a broader measure of the profit rate using 
net operating surplus of the total economy as a proportion of private net stock, excluding 
dwellings and government services. While the latter measure is only a rough estimate, we 
are interested in trends and the two measures are effectively identical regarding trends for 
both the US and UK. So we are relatively confident in using the broader measure for 
Germany. 
 
[FIGURES 1-3 HERE] 
 
 As shown in Figure 1, US corporate profit rate was high from 1945 to 1965, 
averaging 21%, began a steady decline from 1965 to a trough of 9% in 1982 (averaging 
15% the latter period), rising from that trough to a post-1970s peak of 16% in 1997 and 
18% in 2006, but only averaging 13% between 1983 and 2006. Figure 2 presents profit 
rates for the UK. Following the extensive damage inflicted in Britain during WWII, the 
UK corporate profit rate was abnormally high at 44% in 1950, falling more or less 
continuously until hitting a low of just 8% in 1975. It remained at or below 10% until 
1981, after which it began a slight recovery with peaks of 13% in 1985, 15% in 1997, and 
16% in 2007 as the global financial crisis began. Figure 3 presents three different 
estimates for Germany, again based on data availability. By the broad measure, it peaked 
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at 16% in 1963 and again at 16% in 1968, then dropped steadily to a trough of 8% in 
1981, thereafter recovering slightly to a peak of 10% in 1994, the last year for which 
there are data on these measures. Based on the same numerator and a similar denominator 
measuring private fixed capital, the German profit rate recovered slightly further to 11% 
in 2007. 
 
[FIGURE 4 HERE] 
 
Figure 4 shows the share of labour’s income (total compensation) in total national 
income. The wage share for the US peaked at 68% in 1982 and fell to troughs of 64% in 
1997 and 63% in 2010-11. The wage share did bump up to 66% in 2001-2, reflecting the 
hit to profits from the 2001 recession ending the decade-long 1990s boom; apparently 
firms were not able to lay off workers fast enough to sustain profits. Importantly, 
however, nonwage forms of compensation have risen more quickly than wages, meaning 
that the actual income received by employees has dropped even more sharply, from a 
peak of 60% in 1970 to 51% in 2005 (Kliman, 2012: Figure 8.1).  
In the UK, labour’s share averaged 66% from 1960-73, spiked briefly to 74% in 
1975 before dropping to an average of 68% over 1977-80 and then dropping to troughs of 
58% in 1997 and 60% in 2008. The average for the period from 1960-80 was 67% versus 
62% for 1981-2011. The spike in labour’s share from 1973-75 reflects the hit on profits 
from the deep recession beginning in 1973 and likewise the 1991 recession produced a 
brief bump in labour’s share. In Germany labour’s share rose steadily from a much lower 
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point of 50% in 1960 to a peak of 65% in 1981 and another peak of 66% in 1993, falling 
after that to a trough of 57% in 2007.  
These data provide support for Lipietz’s (1982) argument that in response to the 
declining profit rate capital began a sustained and multipronged assault on labour, 
attempting to recover profits in part through increasing the profit share. In the US the 
wage share dropped from 60% in 1970 to 51% in 2005, but the drop in total 
compensation was smaller. A substantial part of rising nonwage compensation in the US 
is health care costs, which are uniquely high among advanced capitalist economies due to 
the waste involved with myriad ‘free market’ insurance companies and private HMOs. 
Additionally, Mohun (2006) showed that a rise in the rate of surplus value after 1979 
went almost entirely to the wages of supervisors. Thus, even though capital attacked 
labour’s wages, there has been no sustained recovery of the profit rate to Fordist levels in 
the US. In the UK the profit rate had a slight recovery after 1980, and the data suggest 
that a decline in labour’s share helped drive the slight reversal of the long decline, 
although the UK private sector also failed to see a sustained recovery, its profit rate 
averaging just 12% over the 1981-2009 period. In Germany there has also been no 
sustained recovery of the profit rate to Fordist levels, although an upward trend began in 
1981 with a faster rise starting in 1993. The decline in German labour’s wage share did 
not occur until later that the other countries, with a sharp decline in 1993, dropping 9 
percentage points by 2007, providing a boost to the profit rate.  
 We now turn to examine the labour market mechanisms employers used to reduce 
labour’s share of income, before turning back to the question of growth and the 
dysfunctionality of the postfordist regime. Figure 4 also charts union density rates 
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alongside the wage share. In all three countries a visual inspection suggests the two 
trends are closely linked, particularly for the postfordist period. Indeed, the simple 
correlation for union density and labour’s share between 1975-2010 is .63 for the US, .71 
for the UK and .72 for Germany. While the correlation, of course, says nothing about 
causality, these correlations are consistent with the standard understanding of unions as 
organisations designed to bargain for increases in member wages. The higher correlations 
in the UK and Germany likely reflect the more powerful unions and higher levels of 
bargaining in these countries, as against the weaker and more decentralised US union 
movement. The UK had multiemployer agreements that set minimum terms and 
conditions within sectors and industries until the 1980s, and Germany the same until 
more recently, suggesting that unionisation matters more for wage setting across the 
economy. In the US, with only 25% of the workforce covered by union contracts in 1975, 
employers were freer to reduce wages without having to gain concessions from unions.  
 We argued above that the postfordist regime in the US has seen a shift from a 
dominant logic of employment internalisation, including opportunities for promotion and 
administratively-determined wages, to one of externalisation, including flatter 
organisational structures due to outsourcing and downsizing and market-determined 
wages. Evidence of such externalisation is found in polarised job growth. Wright and 
Dwyer (2003) presented evidence on the US comparing the decades of the 1960s to the 
1990s. They found that growth was, respectively, 2 versus 17 per cent in the lowest job-
quality decile, 30 versus 11 per cent in the middle two deciles, and 40 versus 50 per cent 
in the top three deciles. Goos and Manning (2007) presented evidence on the UK 
showing that job growth from 1979 to 1999 was entirely concentrated in the bottom two 
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and top two wage deciles. Goos and collaborators (2009) presented data on the UK and 
Germany. Examining changes in shares of hours worked over 1993–2006 for the four 
lowest paying occupations, the nine middling and the eight highest paying occupations, 
they found rates, respectively, of 5.8, -10.3 and 4.6% for the UK, and 3.1, -8.7 and 5.7% 
for Germany. Fernández-Macías (2012) presented further evidence of change in 
employment levels from 1995-2007, showing that UK job growth was concentrated in the 
second lowest and top two wage quintiles, and that German job growth was entirely 
concentrated in the bottom one and top two quintiles.   
Such patterns of job polarisation are consistent with widespread employment 
externalisation by corporations. In the US case, there is extensive quantitative and 
qualitative evidence (reviewed in Vidal, forthcoming) that employers have been 
reorganising work by outsourcing and reducing job classifications with lean staffing 
strategies. This, along with the broader transition to a service economy, has generated a 
rise in entry-level jobs with no training or promotion opportunities. Concurrent with this 
has been the broader transition to a service-based economy. The extent to which 
corporate employment strategy and the occupational structure of the UK and Germany 
are similar to the US will have to await future research, but the data on declining wage 
shares and rising job polarisation in the UK and Germany are strongly suggestive of 
common underlying institutional labour market trends.   
 
[FIGURES 5 & 6 HERE] 
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Finally, what has been the effect of declining shares for labour on growth? Is 
there evidence of a problem of underconsumptionism? Figure 5 presents decennial GDP 
growth rates. By the mainstream standard of 3% as normal, Fordist growth in the US and 
the UK was well above normal (data were not available for Germany). The US managed 
to maintain moderate levels of 3.2% over the 1970s, ‘80s and ‘90s but experienced a 
dismal 1.8% in the 2000s. The UK has come in below 3% in each of the decades since 
the 1960s with just 2.03% in the 2000s. Germany managed 3.08% in the 1970s but 
hovered around 2% in the ‘80s and ‘90s, dropping to just 1.15% in the 2000s. These data 
indicate that the UK and Germany have been stagnationist for the entirety of their 
postfordist regimes while the US was able to achieve moderate growth for much the first 
two decades of the postfordist regime before it became fully stagnationist in its third 
decade.  
As Figure 6 shows, between 1995 and 2007, the debt-to-income ratio rose by 49% 
in the US and 70% in the UK. In contrast, the ratio has been essentially stable in 
Germany, rising only by 4%. These data are evidence of the financialization of workers’ 
revenue (Lapavitsas, 2011) in the US and UK, but not in Germany. A common 
suggestion regarding low debt in Germany is that memories of Weimar inflation have 
stoked fears ‘that excessive debt-financing would spark inflation’ and so Germans have 
‘stuck rigidly to neoliberal orthodoxies’ (Harvey, 2010: 141). Perhaps, but explanations 
based on national culture are suspect. A more structural explanation would be Germany’s 
comparatively low homeownership rate of 43%, versus around 70% for the UK and US 
before the housing bubble burst and the financial crisis went global.2 In the US, 
mortgages are the primary means of debt-financing for most of the population, including 
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home equity withdrawals, although low-income non-homeowners primarily turn to credit 
card debt (Barba and Pivetti, 2009). Lower homeownership may be an indication of less 
financialization in Germany. In any case, these data support the argument that the higher 
growth rates in the US were sustained in part by consumer debt. Macroeconomic 
demand-regime analysis provides further evidence that the US is a debt-led regime, 
whereas Germany is an export-led regime (Onaran et al., 2010; Stockhammer, 2012).  
 
Discussion 
The article has developed a theory of dysfunctional accumulation regimes and presented 
an empirical analysis showing that the model of postfordism as an inherently 
dysfunctional regime applies to the US, UK and Germany. Table 1 presents a summary of 
the findings. The postfordist regime in the US has been and continues to be dysfunctional 
insofar as it has not experienced a sustained recovery in the profit rate (despite a 
declining wage share for labour) and because it has maintained moderate growth levels 
for two of its three decades via debt-led growth. Its stagnant growth in the 2000s despite 
rising household debt suggests more serious problems associated with overproduction. As 
of 2001, 20% of the 55 million American homeowners were delinquent on their 
mortgages or owed more than their house was worth (Greider, 2011), consistent with 
Stockhammer’s (2012) argument about the inherent fragility of debt-led growth. 
 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
24 
 
The postfordist regime in the UK has been and continues to be dysfunctional 
because it has not experienced a sustained recovery in the profit rate (despite a declining 
wage share for labour) and it has experienced four decades of stagnant growth. 
Stagnation began in the 1970s while the decline in labour’s share and the profit rate 
recovery both began in 1980, suggesting a shift in the cause of stagnation from the profit-
rate decline under Fordism to underconsumptionism in the postfordist regime. As a result 
of declining purchasing power, household debt rose but has not been sufficient to boost 
growth out of stagnation, suggesting it may not be a debt-led regime, although it is 
possible that growth would be even more dismal without credit-driven consumption. The 
answer will have to await future demand-regime analysis.  
Finally, the postfordist regime in Germany has been and continues to be 
dysfunctional because it has not experienced a sustained profit-rate recovery (although it 
did see a slight rise in the profit rate due to a declining wage share for labour) and 
because it has experienced three decades of stagnant growth. Its wage share did not begin 
a sustained decline until 1993, suggesting that the stagnant growth is not driven by 
underconsumptionism but largely by a consistently low profit rate, likely in combination 
with overproduction.   
Our focus here has been on the macroeconomic analysis of dysfunctional 
accumulation, but we have emphasised that the underlying mechanisms shaping profit 
rates and wage shares are rooted in labour market institutions, in particular 
deunionisation and job polarisation in a service economy. Base on the US case we argued 
that job polarisation resulted from a new logic of employment externalisation in the form 
of reduced security, training and promotion opportunities, and market-determined wages. 
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In our analysis, these trends, along with neoliberal policies, are not simply one alternative 
among many, but are necessarily driven by the structural context of postfordist 
capitalism. Indeed, as Heyes (2011) has shown, employment security has been decreasing 
across Western European economies, despite flexicurity being the dominant labour 
market policy prescription of the European Commission. The extent to which a logic of 
employment externalisation and its cousin, shareholder value, underlies job polarisation 
in the UK and Germany is an important topic for future research. These labour market 
outcomes have been driven by competition between capitals and struggle between 
classes, which, following Clarke (1990-1991), we view as manifestations of a permanent 
tendency toward overproduction in capitalism. This provides the general context within 
which the stagnationist tendencies variably become manifest, depending on the state of 
the class struggle within particular national institutional frameworks. We have provided 
evidence that Germany is stagnating due to a low profit rate and the UK due to 
underconsumptionism, while the US diverted underconsumptionist stagnation for the first 
two decades of postfordism through debt-led growth.  
Opponents of underconsumptionism argue that investment demand can produce 
strong growth as businesses sell to each other (Shaikh, 1978; Kliman, 2012). But as 
Foster and Magdoff (2009) showed, in the US surplus of capital with a lack of sufficient 
outlets for productive investment lead to rampant speculation through the development of 
a raft of esoteric financial instruments, a housing bubble and predatory mortgage lending. 
And empirical demand-regime models have demonstrated that US growth is debt-led 
(Onaran et al., 2010). Together, these findings provide strong support for the 
underconsumptionist argument. But the data from Foster and Magdoff also indicate 
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overproduction. Now, it seems clear that financialization in the US played a significant 
role in the latest crisis by increasing financial instability, more specifically by inflating 
the housing bubble and setting up the 2007 collapse due to widespread default by 
subprime mortgage borrowers (Appelbaum, 2011; Stockhammer, 2012). But 
financialization, including debt-led growth, grew out of the general condition of 
overproduction: surplus capacity with surplus capital (Foster and Magdoff, 2009).   
Our analysis implies that underconsumptionism cannot be easily remedied by 
redistribution because it was produced through class struggle in the labour market as 
capital attempted to recover profit rates. In the postfordist regime, any redistribution of 
income to labour would put downward pressure on profit rates that are already 
historically low. Similarly, it has been argued by Marxists (e.g. Duménil and Lévy, 2004) 
and other critical economists (e.g. Stockhammer, 2012) that the primary source of 
declining wage shares and financialization is neoliberalism. This suggests that the current 
problems result from policy regime that could be reversed. In contrast, the argument of 
this article is that dysfunctional accumulation and the maladies it has inflicted on labour 
and labour markets are fundamentally structural economic problems inherent to the 
postfordist regime. The reason for using the concept of postfordism is because of the 
fundamental uniqueness of the Fordist regime. With the demise of Fordism, capitalism 
has again been unleashed. In the postfordist condition, the prospects for a return to the 
employment norms and declining inequality of the Fordist period are bleak. The plight of 
postfordism appears to be long-term and without any institutional fix that is consistent 
with capitalism as we know it. The time for more widespread consideration of 
alternatives to capitalism is long overdue.  
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1 Economic Report of the President, 2012, Table B-54. 
2 I am indebted to Ian Greer and Hyunji Kwon for helping me tease out this point.  
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TABLE 1: Sources of dysfunctional accumulation in postfordism 
Manifest stagnationist tendencies US UK Germany 
Declining profit rate Yes Yes Yes 
Underconsumptionism -- Yes -- 
Debt-led growth Yes Possibly -- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1: Profit rates, US 
 
Source: For corporate: US Bureau of Economic Analysis (NIPA Table 1.14, line 11); Fixed  
Assets (Table 6.3, line 2). For total economy: National Accounts of OECD Countries, Volume  
II, Detailed Tables, 1963-1969, print; OECD iLibrary, 1970-1996; Flows and Stocks of Fixed  
Capital, 1963-1996, print.  
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FIGURE 2: Profit rates, UK 
 
Source: For corporate: Historical data on gross operating surplus, consumption of fixed capital, and net capital 
stock, all for private nonfinancial and financial corporations, provided by various members of the UK Office of 
National Statistics. For total economy: National Accounts of OECD Countries, Volume II, Detailed  
Tables, 1963-1969, print; OECD iLibrary, 1970-2009; Flows and Stocks of Fixed Capital,  
1963-1993, print; UK ONS, 1994-2009. 
 
FIGURE 3: Profit rates, Germany 
 
Source: For corporate: OECD iLibrary; Database on Capital Stocks in OECD Countries,  
Kiel Institute for the World Economy. For total economy: OECD iLibrary, 1963-2008;  
Flows and Stocks of Fixed Capital, 1963-1994, print; OECD iLibrary, 1991-2008. 
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FIGURE 4: Labour’s share of national income and union density, 1960-2011 
                                                United States                                                                                               United Kingdom                                             
  
 
                                                 Germany        
 
Source: Union density: OECD. Wage share (Total employee compensation over Gross national income): AMECO database, European Commission.
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FIGURE 5: Average decennial GDP growth 
  
Source: BEA (US), ONS (UK), World Bank (Germany).   
 
 
 
FIGURE 6: Household debt to income ratios, 1995-2007 
 
Source: OECD; Eurostat 
Note: For a longer-term view, the US household debt ratio was 34% in 1950 and 58% in 1960.  
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